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Abstract: I identify three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought within 
the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war”, a 
second, “context dependent”, approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare 
within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu, and, finally a “paradoxical 
logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. I offer some 
intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” 
approach to strategy choice. In doing so, I help to reconcile these disparate approaches 
and provide a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as 





 The field of strategic studies has produced a number of seemingly irreconcilable 
approaches to the study of military conflict: What is the nature of strategy? Is it a series 
of enduring “principles of war”, a list of “context-dependent” environments to be 
considered in planning, or does it exist in a special realm of “paradoxical logic”, utterly 
apart from other fields of study? These questions stem from related foundational debates 
with the field: To what degree is war knowable versus uncertain? To what degree is 
strategy an “art”? How does one utilize the unexpected in planning? What is required is a 
reconciliation of the competing approaches to the study of strategy within the field of 
strategic studies. If such a goal could be accomplished, then two benefits would result: a 
deeper understanding of military decision making within the field of strategic studies, as 
well as a more transparent method for choosing among strategies.       
In this paper I take a step towards these ends through a modest contribution, 
which I will term the “dominate-mix” approach. I do so by presenting the concepts of 
“strategy dominance” and “mixed strategies” from game theory to help in resolving the 
tensions within strategic studies. Strategy domination allows a player to compare the 
potential payoffs of her various available strategies against all possible strategies 
available to her opponent(s), while mixed strategies deals with randomization over 
strategies to achieve surprise. In their strictly formal and rigorously mathematical 
presentation, these tools may be too alien and constricting to fit with the temperament 
and needs of the strategic studies community. As simple concepts, however, they 
constitute an accessible tool for improving choice among strategies. They allow for 
recognized principles of war to be employed alongside the “paradoxical logic” of 
strategic surprise across various historic eras conflict – thereby resolving a central tension 
in the field. Further, the dominate-mix approach accords with existing US strategic 
planning that emphasizes ways-ends-means, thereby facilitating its ready comprehension 
and utility.  
In this essay I do not offer a theory of strategy, but simply an articulation of 
strategic choice that can encompass important aspects of the existing debate within the 
strategic studies literature. The goal of this essay is to reconcile seemingly disparate 
strands of this literature by creating a common framework to analyze strategic 
interaction; further, in doing so I offer a prescriptive apparatus that may also help 
practitioners to improve their decision making in the field.         
 The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the current treatment of uncertainty 
within strategic studies and propose a conceptual refinement that is necessary to fruitfully 
tackle the phenomenon. Second, I lay out three prevalent approaches to the study of 
military strategy, which I term the “principles of war”, “context dependent”, and 
“paradoxical logic” schools, and provide a brief evaluation of each. Third, I explain the 
concepts of “strategy dominance” and “mixed strategies” from game theory and then 
show how these help to reconcile the three approaches in a simple “dominate-mix” 
application. Finally, I offer some conclusions and suggest ways forward for this line of 
inquiry.    
 
Sources of uncertainty in war 
War is often argued to contain both extreme complexity and stark simplicity. 
Harrison summarizes this contradiction powerfully: “The imperatives of war appear to 
simplify everything down to a few basic requirements, but to attain them in the ‘resistant 
medium’ constituted by danger, shock, surprise, excitement, fear, hunger, exhaustion, 
wounds, bereavement, boredom, isolation, ignorance, deception, self-interest and 
indiscipline turns out to a process of endless complexity” (1998: xix-xx). Further, Handel 
argues, in his analysis of Clausewitz, that this contradiction essentially precludes the 
ability of observers to predict (and hence to model) war:  
The reader’s attention must be directed to the tension or seeming contradiction 
between Clausewitz’s…emphasis on understanding the nature of the war one is 
about to embark on…and, on the other hand…friction, chance, uncertainty, luck 
and the poor quality of intelligence which reveals the near impossibility of 
reliably predicting the course of a war…this is only one of the many ‘internal 
contradictions’, ‘tensions’, and ‘paradoxical’ problems that can be 
identified…The problem lies in the contradictory nature of war itself (2001: 303, 
emphases in original). 
 
One is wrong to despair, however, when confronted with such a problem. The fact that 
war is a complex, strategic, and uncertain environment does not make it unique, 
‘contradictory’, or preclude its analysis. The struggle for strategic theorists has always 
been to distinguish the knowable from the inherently random and do their best to 
comprehend the former. The first step to profitably dealing with the seeming chaos of 
war is to distinguish between two distinct sources of uncertainty: stochastic and strategic. 
Once this is done, the ground is laid for choosing the appropriate tools to deal with each 
in turn, thus allowing the most useful (if not perfect) models of war and warfare.    
 Systems can be thought of as deterministic or stochastic. A deterministic system 
is one in which outcomes are driven solely by systematic factors – in other words, if all 
the contributing causes can be specified in a model, then variation on the dependent 
variable will be accounted for entirely. A stochastic system, however, allows for some 
random component that cannot be modeled (Kincaid 1994). It is generally agreed that any 
social system (such as war) is, by its very nature, stochastic to some degree. Simply using 
this conceptual starting point would help account for the “chance”, “friction”, and “luck” 
to which Handel refers: a weapon misfires in battle, an unexpected change in weather 
inhibits maneuver, or troops are debilitated by an outbreak of an unforeseen illness.1 By 
simply thinking in such terms, it allows the analyst to conceptually sort out those factors 
he or she argues exert a systematic effect on some dependent variable from pure 
randomness. For example, imagine a pool of transport trucks which are necessary to 
supply an army on the march. Analysis of data shows that, at any given time, 10% of the 
vehicles are malfunctioning and in need of repair. For any given vehicle, it is impossible 
to know precisely when or where it will break down (perhaps at some critical point in a 
crucial battle), as we simply have a probabilistic model of vehicle failure across the fleet 
of trucks. However, we can reasonably expect that if we increase the budget for vehicle 
maintenance, this failure rate will decrease (and if we reduce it, vehicle failure will 
increase). Therefore, we can model a systematic input (budget) as one factor that will 
affect the dependent variable (vehicle failure rates) – even within a system which 
contains a stochastic component.         
If random chance were known to be the only source of uncertainty in war, 
strategic choice could become a simple optimization-under-constraint problem: 
systematic factors would be modeled and choices could be weighed through expected 
                                                 
1 One can press further on this issue by distinguishing more formally between “risk” and “uncertainty” 
following the classic treatment by Knight (1921/2006). “Risk” is applied to sets of outcomes which occur 
with a known probability distribution (such as the flipping of a fair coin or the rolling of a fair dice). 
“Uncertainty” is applied to sets of outcomes that occur without a known probability distribution (such as 
the occurrence of an earthquake). It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the full impact of this 
distinction on the field of strategic studies.    
utility equations. The resulting attempt to forecast war outcomes might come to resemble 
something akin to meteorology. Strategic theorists would counter, however, that simply 
recognizing the presence of random chance on the battlefield is not sufficient to 
understand war– there is another distinct source of uncertainty on the battlefield: the 
enemy. This represents a fundamentally different concern, which we label “strategic 
uncertainty”. This occurs when outcomes are jointly determined by the choices made by 
multiple, self-interested actors. In this case, decision theory (simply optimizing among 
risky choices) is no longer appropriate because strategic opponents are not mindless 
probability generators (like the rolling of dice) (Tsebelis 1989). One simple way to show 
these distinctions is through comparing three games: playing a slot machine is simple 
probability (randomness of the outcomes generated by the machine), tic-tac-toe is a game 
of strategic uncertainty (outcomes are solely determined by the choices of the two self-
interested players), and poker combines both (the element of randomness is provided by 
the shuffled deck of cards while the strategic uncertainty is provided by the choices of the 
self-interested players to bet, raise, hold, or fold).  
Gray points out how often this distinction between random chance and strategic 
uncertainty can be overlooked, even within the strategic studies community: “People 
unfamiliar with the arcane world of defence analysis might be surprised to learn just how 
common it is for imaginative, energetic, and determined strategic thinkers…to forget that 
the enemy too has preferences and choices” (1999: 20). Even in the realm of strategic 
uncertainty systematic analysis is still possible – as long as the tools being applied have 
been developed with such a choice environment in mind (as has game theory, to which I 
shall later return). It is a crucial first step, however, simply to distinguish between these 
two types of uncertainty: stochastic and strategic. 
 
Three existing approaches to military strategy 
 I identify three approaches to military strategy in the existing strategic studies 
literature: ‘principles of war’, ‘context dependent’, and ‘paradoxical logic’. This does not 
claim to be an exhaustive list, nor do many authors fit neatly into only one of these 
categories; Clausewitz, in his brilliant – yet internally incoherent work – exemplifies all 
three at various points (1976). Yet it is useful to provide crude labels and discuss each 
approach independently to explain strengths and shortcomings. It is only after these three 
schools of thought are outlined is it possible to show how the concepts of “strategy 
domination” and “mixed-strategies” can assist in their fruitful integration among these 
distinct approaches to strategic study.  
Principles of war approach  
 In its simplest depiction, the “principles” approach is characterized by three 
attributes: a framework of causal laws, which generates testable hypotheses, and is 
applicable across the entire scope of warfare. In short, this approach constitutes a search 
to uncover a causal system which would explain significant aspects of war, warfare, and 
strategy in a manner analogous to a physical science. Though the most conceptually 
straightforward, it is has fallen out of favor over the last century, due its unfulfilled 
claims of crisp predictive success.         
 This approach is the most intellectually ambitious of the three outlined here, as it 
purports to analyze war in a manner analogous to the physical sciences: the ultimate goal 
would therefore consist of a system of deductively connected hypotheses that are actively 
subjected to possible empirical refutation through repeated testing (Brodbeck 1968: 457). 
Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609-80) was one of the first to conceptualize such a “science 
of war”, which he argued would “reduce experience to universal and fundamental rules” 
thereby encompassing the “whole of world history” such that “no remarkable military 
deed…cannot be reduced to these instructions” (quoted in Gat 2001: 22-23). Such work 
on a set of universal principles of war became increasingly popular through the French 
Enlightenment and culminated most famously in the work of Antoine Jomini 
(1862/1992). Even relatively modern thinkers, such as J.F.C. Fuller sought to lay out a 
complete causal system by “do[ing] for war what Copernicus did for astronomy, Newton 
did for physics, and Darwin for natural history…to apply the method of science to the 
study of war” (Fuller 1926/1993: 18).  
 An important aspect of such an endeavor is rigorous testing of the empirical 
implications of the theoretical construct. Jomini, for example, attempts to test his general 
argument by using informal qualitative evidence: “We will apply this great 
principle…and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated campaigns, that, with few 
exceptions, the most brilliant successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an 
adherence to this principle in the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other” 
(1862/1992: 71). It is worth reiterating, that for an argument to purport to be a “theory” of 
war in an accepted scientific sense it must present crisp empirical hypotheses that can be 
falsified by testing. The “principles” approach is alone among the three schools presented 
here to adhere to that requirement.       
 It is also important to recognize that this approach depends upon more than the 
assumption that law-like relationships exist within war; it also often assumes that 
instances of war and/or warfare throughout history are drawn from a homogenous 
population of cases. Jomini states this explicitly when he argues that:  
The fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations of war have 
always existed…These principles are unchangeable; they are independent of the 
nature of the arms employed, of times, of places…For thirty centuries there have 
lived generals who have been more or less happy in their application…the battles 
of Wagram, Pharsalia and Cannae were gained from the same original cause.  
 
Further, Jomini argues that the systematic impact of enduring principles overrides any 
impact of “art”, “genius”, or “creativity”: “Genius…presides over the application of 
recognized rules, and seizes, as it were, all the subtle shades of which their application is 
susceptible. But in any case, the man of genius does not act contrary to the rules” (cited 
in Gat 2001: 114). This is an important point as it precludes the capacity for human 
agency to override the laws of the fixed causal system.  
 The “principles of war” approach then may be considered the most attractive in a 
strictly scientific sense. The problem is that the lofty ambition of this approach seems to 
crash to the ground as each proposed system is soon found to be severely limited in 
general predictive success. In recent decades, then, the quest for a unified and testable 
“science” of war has largely been abandoned in favor of a much less stringent search for 
“suitable, acceptable, and feasible” approaches to strategy (Bartholomees 2008). These 
lowered expectations are perfectly defensible – as long as they maintain conceptual 
coherence. I address this in the following section, which I title the “context dependent” 
approach to strategy – laying out the defining distinctions between the approaches and 
arguing that the two approaches can be reconciled by using trivial necessary conditions to 
theoretically delimit sub-populations of observations.  
 
Context dependent approach 
The aspiration of the “context dependent” approach to strategic studies seems at 
face value to be vastly different from the principles school. In this second approach, 
appropriate strategy is pursued in the context of the unique environment within which 
each war occurs. In this section, I reconsider this vein of strategic studies, distinguishing 
it from the enduring principles approach, and showing how the two can fruitfully be 
integrated into a common conceptual framework by relying on trivial necessary 
conditions to constitute sub-populations of war.  
Consider the work of Gray (1999). On the one hand he contends that strategy is 
universal and presents a set of immutable dimensions of strategy that must be taken into 
account for success in war, and by doing so he purports to “captur[e] the whole nature of 
strategy for all periods [of history]” (1999: 43).2 This may be true, in some broad sense of 
the word “capture”, and yet it is not a theory of strategy in a strictly scientific sense. This 
is the case because there are no hypothesized relationships derived for the 22 or so 
dimensions that would be amenable to empirical testing. Gray defends this choice thus: 
“The precise relationships among the dimensions must always be in some sense 
uncertain…A general theory of strategy…which explains the nature of the subject 
                                                 
2 These dimensions include: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, economy, logistics, organization, 
military administration, information, intelligence, strategic theory, doctrine, technology, military 
operations, command, geography, friction, chance, uncertainty, the adversary, and time. He further argues 
that “truly poor performance in any of [these] dimensions has the potential to offset excellence elsewhere. 
Similarly, a selective excellence…may well offset inferior performance in other dimensions. In general, the 
analysis finds that that there is no single ‘master’ dimension of strategy…” (1999: 16). 
and…how the subject ‘works’, cannot itself explain particular strategic experience” 
(1999: 43). Rather than provide testable hypotheses, then, the work seeks to help 
“historians make better sense of their research while enabling strategic theorists to relate 
the historically unique to more general patterns in strategic experience” (44). 
How can these two approaches (universalist principles and context dependent) be 
reconciled?  Clausewitz points the way when he writes: “every age had its own kind of 
warfare, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, 
therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and 
universally existed to work things out on scientific principles” (1976: 593). The 
important point here is that his position does not preclude the proposing and testing of 
causal laws, but simply warns against over-generalizing beyond certain contexts. To 
approach this challenge fruitfully, one must think hard about the notion of theoretically 
defined sub-populations of war.  
“Populations” in social phenomena are often treated as given, and rarely 
problematized. This is often the case when a single term, such as “war” is given to a 
diverse set of occurrences that may or may not be instances of the same causal process. 
As Ragin argues: 
Sometimes populations contain subgroups that are so distinct that they should be 
treated as analytically separate populations…Often, this mixing of different kinds 
of cases in the same population is missed by the investigator because the 
heterogeneity is mistaken for the play of random forces…Thus, the researcher 
may relegate unrecognized heterogeneity to the error vector of probabilistic 
models when it should be conceived…as multiple populations (2000: 50). 
 
Clausewitz’ proposal that heterogeneity exists among the history of warfare is commonly 
asserted, but I argue it is often done so in a less than useful manner. As an example, 
Jomini’s theory of strategy and operations is commonly lauded as useful, but only within 
the ‘Napoleonic era’ within which it was articulated. Other portions of military history 
are often labeled similarly as ‘classical’, ‘Medieval’, ‘early modern’, et cetera. Ragin 
argues that a more useful way to classify sub-populations is by identifying the necessary 
conditions which define the causal logic which operates within said sub-population. A 
brief example can be seen in recent work by Arquilla (2010), who recognizes a 
distinction between from ‘state-state’ to ‘state-network’ conflict, and then proceeds to 
offer arguments and policy recommendations that are appropriate for this newly 
identified sub-population of armed conflicts. An advantage of identifying the trivial 
necessary conditions thusly is twofold: first, rather than using a historical label that 
carries no additional analytic information, using a necessary condition to delimit the 
scope of an argument forces one to explicitly articulate the theoretical mechanism by 
which they choose to characterize the sub-population, second, such a method does not 
force one to lump conflicts together according to linear time (“the 19th century”, “the 
post-Cold War era”, et cetera), but by theory. A vivid example is provided by the late 
nineteenth century French navy; as the development of steam-powered warships restored 
tactical movement to naval warfare, naval planners briefly engaged the idea of re-
integrating rams on the prows of its vessels – by comparing steam-powered ships to the 
oar-powered triremes of the classical era (Ropp and Roberts 1987). This showed that by 
thinking in terms of the necessary condition of “rapid tactical maneuver”, it was 
concluded that the steam powered vessels of the late nineteenth century were, in some 
crucial ways, closer to the warships of the ancient Greeks than to their immediate 
predecessors of the mid-nineteenth century.  
 In sum, the “context dependent” approach can be reconciled with the “principles” 
approach by explicitly addressing the notion of theoretically defined sub-populations. 
The advantage of the “context dependent” approach is that it allows for the specifics of 
each shifting environment to be factored into some causal argument. Further, it moves 
beyond military operations and combat, and recognizes that war is embedded within a 
broader political, cultural, diplomatic, and economic milieu. It can not only ask “Is this 
strategy militarily effective on the battlefield?”, but also, “Is it morally acceptable?, 
Institutionally feasible?, Diplomatically appropriate?, Politically expedient?”. By 
focusing on the concept of theoretically defined populations this discussion has helped to 
reconcile the first two approaches to strategy; using the first approach to search for 
rigorous models of war, and using the second approach to make these models sensitive to 
the evolving social, technological, and physical environments in which wars take place. 
What unifies these two approaches to war is that they rely on some form of “rules” – 
either universal rules (first approach) or rules which apply to some delimited time and 
space (second approach). We now turn to the third approach to war, one which is 
premised on the “breaking of rules” as the defining logic of strategy. After this, 
seemingly irreconcilable, school is introduced I will turn to a simple framework for 
integrating all three approaches. 
 
Paradoxical logic approach  
 The element of surprise has been a central concept for strategic theorists 
throughout history. Recently, however, Edward Luttwak (2002) has elevated surprise to 
the central pillar for military strategy: arguing that war operates in a unique realm of 
“paradoxical logic”: 
Consider an ordinary tactical choice…to move toward its objective, an advancing 
force can choose between two roads, one good and one bad, the first broad, direct, 
and well paved, the second narrow, circuitous, and unpaved. Only in the 
paradoxical realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, because it is only in 
war that a bad road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be 
less strongly defended…the bad option may deliberately be chosen in the hope 
that the unfolding action will not be expected by the enemy (2002: 3-4). 
 
Taken at face value, Luttwak argues that war is essentially a game of Rochambeau 
(“rock-paper-scissors”); the degree to which something follows the “rules” it is 
predictable and can be countered. Luttwak argues that doing the unexpected, for the 
purpose of generating strategic uncertainty in the mind of the opponent, is the 
consummate activity for a strategist. This would seem to utterly negate the first 
(principles) and second (context) approaches outlined above – as adhering to any logical 
“rule” of strategy would make an actor predictable and, therefore, vulnerable. This point 
of view is epitomized in the film “Patton” when General George S. Patton (played by 
George C. Scott) says of his defeated enemy: “Rommel, you magnificent bastard! I read 
your book!” It is implied in this exclamation that, by adhering to his own stated rules, his 
German opponent had made himself predictable, and therefore, vulnerable.3    
Luttwak’s work on paradoxical logic has generated strong reactions. Martin Van 
Crevald has described it as “brilliant” and as having been “written in heaven”(cited in 
Goyne 2002: 33). Others have decried it as a “trivial wordgame”, “foolish” and – as a 
                                                 
3 Previous writers had noted this paradox long before Luttwak. In 1809, the Prussian Georg von Berenhorst 
wrote of Jomini’s “rules” of warfare: “As long as Napoleon was the only one to exercise them, he could 
achieve success, but once everyone employed his system, it would cancel itself out, and numerical 
 superiority, courage, and the general’s fortune would again reign supreme” (paraphrased in Gat 2001: 
157).           
potential guide for policy – “just plain frightening” (Johnson 1995: 121-124). Others 
have settled into more reasoned critiques: “Luttwak’s brilliant explanation of how what 
works today in strategy may not work tomorrow, precisely because it worked today…is 
persuasive, but limited in its explanatory power…” (Gray 1999: 87-88). The most 
fundamental critique of Luttwak comes from Bartholomees: “[the] paradoxical nature of 
war is too broad a generalization…if war were completely paradoxical…war would not 
yield to study. In fact, much of war – including its paradox – is very logical. In a sense, 
Luttwak’s argument proves the proposition and refutes itself” (Bartholomees 2008: 26). 
Does Luttwak’s argument indeed consume itself? Or can it be salvaged from its own 
seeming contradiction? How can the single penetrating insight of paradoxical logic be 
reconciled with the search for principles of war? 
 Luttwak hints at a structure for rescuing strategic choice from becoming a purely 
random (and therefore unknowable) process. He does so by arguing that “[a]t the limit, 
surprise could in theory be best achieved by acting in a manner so completely paradoxical 
as to be utterly self-defeating…Obviously the paradoxical path of ‘least expectation’ 
must stop short of self-defeating extremes, but beyond that it is a matter of probabilistic 
calculations” (2002: 7). Two notions are captured in this quote that bear further scrutiny. 
The first is that some strategies should be excluded a priori due to their extreme 
unattractiveness, dropping nuclear weapons on your own capitol would surely astonish 
your opponent, but the costs associated with this strategy would surely outweigh the 
gains of surprise. The second is that the remaining strategies under consideration should 
each be considered according to some probabilistic mechanism. Luttwak leaves this 
distinction at an informal level of discussion – what is required is a more precise analytic 
framework for dismissing some strategies and conceptualizing the use of probabilism in 
choosing from among those which remain under consideration. In the following section I 
discuss some conceptual tools for doing precisely these things, before using these tools to 
reconcile the three approaches to strategic studies outlined above.      
 
Game Theory: The Mixing and Domination of Strategies   
 An obvious statement someone might make about war is that it is a strategic 
contest among two or more self-interested actors. The implications of this point, 
however, are often neglected in the study of military strategy. Even one of the most 
celebrated students of war, Clausewitz, has been accused of neglecting this aspect of 
strategy:  
Clausewitz advises that ‘in the whole range of human activities, war most closely 
resembles a game of cards’…a thought that leads us to expect careful treatment of 
interaction among calculating adversaries. In fact, On War says much more about 
how ‘to impose our will on the enemy’ than it does about the perils posed by the 
enemy’s will. On War insists properly from the outset on recognition that war is 
not a unilateral exercise. Nonetheless, the book is weaker than it should be in the 
analysis of the ‘enemy’ (Gray 1999: 103-104).   
 
The proper study of war and military strategy, therefore, should include analytic concepts 
designed to model choice over outcomes which are jointly determined by two or more 
self-interested actors. An appropriate model would, therefore, recognize that decisions 
must be made with some anticipation of what the opponent might do. This is, by 
definition, making choices within the realm of strategic uncertainty – an environment for 
which game theory was created.  
Game theory is a very contentious methodological tool and has inherent 
limitations. Many social scientists eschew the approach because it is too abstract, 
culturally bound, and fails to capture the “plasticity” of creative human behavior (Archer 
and Tritter 2000; Friedman 1996; Lichbach 2003). Specifically within the realm of 
security studies, game theoretic approaches have raised concerns. Stephen Walt, for 
example, argues that rational choice models (of which non-cooperative game theory is a 
subset) are too mathematically obscure to be evaluated by a wide audience, are 
completely alien to policy-makers and military practitioners, tend simply to re-package 
well established or obvious conclusions, and generally engage in methodological 
“overkill” (for Walt's full argument and several critical responses see Brown et al. 2000). 
A general debate on the efficacy of rational choice models and their contribution to 
strategic analysis is beyond the scope of this essay.4 Yet, given this discussion, it may not 
be appropriate to import the entire formal framework of non-cooperative game theory to 
strategic studies. It may be useful, however, to utilize some baser components and their 
attendant logic – such as examining how an actor should make a decision when the 
outcome also depends on the choices of others. To do so, one should ask how that actor 
would consider all of the possible outcomes of each choice available to him against the 
various outcomes that would come about contingent on the available choices of the 
opponent. Two tools from game theory, “dominant strategies” and “mixed strategies”, 
embody this logic of analysis at the simplest level.       
 
Dominant and dominated strategies 
                                                 
4 In fact, the explicit use of game theory to study military and operational strategy has been extremely 
limited (a noteworthy exception being Haywood 1954). Even its impact on the golden age of nuclear 
deterrence theory has been overstated (Schelling 1964; Trachtenberg 1991). For an excellent critical survey 
see Zagare (2008).  
 The process of strategy domination allows a player to compare the potential 
payoffs of her various available strategies against all possible strategies available to her 
opponent(s). It comes in two forms: strict (or strong) domination and weak domination. A 
strategy strictly dominates another strategy for a player if it is superior (provides a higher 
payoff) regardless of what the other players play.5 For example, in the classic 2x2 game 
“prisoners’ dilemma” (see figure 1) Row player should play “bottom” as it results in a 
higher payoff regardless of the strategy chosen by Column player (3 > 2 if Column plays 
“left” and 1 > 0 if column plays “right”). Similarly, Column player should play “right” 
regardless of what Row player plays. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 This concept of a “strictly dominated strategy” accords nicely with Luttwak’s 
notion of a strategic choice that is so unattractive as to be a “self-defeating extreme”. If it 
results in a worse payoff than an available alternative, regardless of what choice the 
opponent makes, then it should be discarded a priori; it is never attractive and cannot 
even be threatened to confound a rational opponent in expectation.6   
 
Mixed strategies 
                                                 
5 Weak domination occurs when a strategy results in payoffs as good as and sometimes better than another, 
regardless of what the other player plays. For example, if the number 3 in the “top, right” box was changed 
to a 2, the strategy “right” for Column player would weakly dominate “left” – as the player would always 
do as well or better playing “right” than if he played “left” (2 = 2, 1 > 0).  
6 In other words, a strictly dominated strategy is not used with positive probability in any mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium. This is not the case with weakly dominated strategies, which may be assigned a non-zero 
probability in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Osborne 2004: 120-121).  
We can now consider the second part of Luttwak’s paradoxical logic - 
randomization of choice. Once strictly dominated strategies are eliminated from 
consideration, and no dominant strategy has been identified, remaining strategies can be 
played according to some probabilistic mechanism. This randomization component is 
captured nicely with the notion of “mixed strategies”. Consider the game of “matching 
pennies” (figure 2). The players choose to show either “heads” or “tails” of a penny; if 
the two coins match, Row player wins a dollar and Column player loses a dollar. If they 
do not match, Column player wins. It is obvious that neither player has a dominant 
strategy (if Column player plays “head”, then Row would prefer to also play “head”, but 
if Column were to play “tail” then Row would also prefer to play “tail”). If Row player 
knew what Column was going to play (perhaps due to a discernible pattern or faithfulness 
to some “rule book”) then Row player would be able to use this advantage to win the 
dollar. In fact, in the “matching pennies” game, the only Nash equilibrium is for both 
actors to play each strategy with a probability of 1/2 (which they could do easily by 
flipping their pennies rather than consciously choosing a strategy to play).        
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 The use of mixed strategies in the matching pennies game raises a number of 
interesting questions, both for the application of game theoretic models in general and to 
military strategy in particular. How can we regard mixed strategies in practice? Do 
generals (or any strategic actor) actually randomize over strategy? (“Should we engage in 
a surgical airstrike of Cuba or an invasion at the Bay of Pigs? Let’s flip a coin!”) There is 
not a consensus on this point. One way to interpret the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the 
“matching pennies” game (as described above) is to argue that each player actually flips a 
coin to decide. A second interpretation is that, as samples of potential players are drawn 
from an underlying population, one half of those players would be expected to play heads 
with probability one, and the other half would be expected to play tails with probability 
one (Osborne 2004: 99-105). Perhaps the most useful way to apply the concept of 
randomization to strategic studies is to focus on the uncertain expectations that are 
formed in the mind of a rational opponent when confronted with player in a “matching 
pennies” type situation (Vega-Redondo 2003). In this case, it includes observable actions 
that you take which exacerbate the enemy’s uncertainty. Liddell-Hart captures this logic, 
to some degree, with his maxim of threatening multiple objects with the operational line 
of approach – thereby creating uncertainty as to which city will be attacked and forcing 
the enemy to waste resources by fortifying both (Liddell Hart 1991: 126-137). The 
essential point is that randomization over strategies is only useful when it serves to create 
uncertainty in the mind of the enemy, whereas actually choosing randomly (flipping a 
coin in your command tent) may not be useful.   
 
The “dominate-mix” approach in practice 
 How can we translate the insights of dominated strategies and mixed strategies 
into a useable framework for strategic studies? We can do so by integrating the three 
approaches outlined above into a strategic choice process in the following manner:    
•  “principles of war”: This approach is utilized to help estimate the outcomes for 
each strategy match-up (this will be necessary to predict likely outcomes – what 
will actually occur in every permutation of strategic interactions). 
• “context dependent”: This approach is utilized to evaluate and rank how the 
attractiveness of the various potential outcomes by embedding the military result 
within the cultural, diplomatic, political context – and to help to theoretically 
delimit the population (geographically, technologically), to consider how 
principles apply in the given context. 
•  “paradoxical logic”: This approach is utilized to systematize the use 
randomization over strategies (mix) to achieve surprise and identify strategic 
options that are to be dismissed outright (dominated) or should be chosen outright 
(dominant). 
 
 The first two approaches are necessary to flesh out the counterfactual strategic 
interactions (principles), and evaluate the relative worth of the results (context). In terms 
of the first approach, some acknowledgement of the existence of “principles of war” must 
exist for any commander to mentally work through the potential outcome of strategic, 
operational, or tactical choices. If, on the other hand, each military encounter is taken to 
be sui generis, then no form of prognostication (and hence no planning) is possible; to 
some extent potential outcomes today must be comparable to past outcomes (evidence 
from previous conflicts or perhaps from training and simulations) to form reasonable 
expectations of battlefield outcomes. This was seen in recent debate over US planning, as 
operational emphasis switched from Iraq to Afghanistan. Were these two warfare 
environments alike? Or at least comparable enough to allow tactics and strategy that had 
been effective in one to apply to the other (Lalwani 2009)? If not, should we instead look 
for lessons from the nineteenth century British experience in Afghanistan (Jackson 
2006)? Or is the current conflict utterly unique? This question is answered as one makes 
counterfactual arguments concerning the impact of proposed strategic choices; an 
analysis of trivial necessary conditions helps to lend rigor to these comparisons by 
scoping out what proposed sub-population of cases to which the current Afghan conflict 
belongs.  
The second approach also allows for military outcomes to be evaluated and 
ranked according to the broader social and political context. For example, a squad of 
soldiers takes fire from a single sniper who subsequently retreats into an otherwise 
peaceful village. One possible course of action is for the squad leader to call in an 
airstrike to kill the sniper – and flatten the village in the process. If the squad were 
German soldiers operating in the Ukraine during the summer of 1941, this might be an 
appropriate choice. For a squad of American soldiers operating in present-day 
Afghanistan, it is not. In both cases the military outcome is identical, but the broader 
context determines the degree to which the outcome of such a choice is deemed desirable. 
To determine this, one must look above the level of the battlefield, to the political, social, 
and cultural context in which the battle is taking place. 
Once the likely outcomes of various strategy match-ups are determined and 
evaluated, they must be considered in light of the “paradoxical logic” of strategy. Those 
strategies remaining under consideration would need (according to Luttwak) to be chosen 
according to some rule of randomization.7 For example, the Allies consciously engaged 
in strategic deception to make the Germans uncertain as to whether Calais or Normandy 
was to be the target of the D-Day invasion. This resulted in the German’s spreading their 
resources in fortifying both locations and failing to commit crucial armor reserves when 
the actual invasion took place. At the other end of the spectrum, the German attack at 
Kursk (Operation Citadel) was planned and executed with a dearth of subterfuge; “Aerial 
reconnaissance and patrol activity showed the Russians…had no doubt where and how 
the Germans would strike, and were energetically preparing to meet them…Once again 
the old Blitzkrieg formula – Stukas, short, intense artillery bombardment, massed tanks 
and infantry in close contact – was fed into the computer…”, all of which resulted in a 
resounding operational defeat for the Wehrmacht (Clark 1965: 324-330). As has been 
shown, the concept of “mixing over strategies” provides this logic, particularly when 
notion of randomization can be interpreted in terms of taking actions for the purpose of 
making the opponent uncertain as to the actions you intend to take. When this is done, the 
opponent is put at a disadvantage.  
Once again, this simple “dominate-mix” process does not provide a theory of 
strategy, but helps to integrate the insights of three existing schools of thought on 
strategic choice. By utilizing such a choice mechanism, both analysts and practitioners 
may gain some insight. Analysts may benefit from simply seeing the complementarity of 
seemingly disparate approaches and how they may be broken into component parts of a 
logical whole. Practitioners may be able to utilize such a simple process in the actual 
planning of future campaigns or the vetting of ongoing operations. 
                                                 
7 Given that the alternatives will, in almost all cases, be simply rank ordered, rather than given cardinal 
values with a common metric, the determination of actual probabilities (“choose strategy A with probability 
2/3 and strategy B with probability 1/3”) would not be possible.    
In fact, the conceptual framework provided lends itself to existing treatments of 
strategic planning. Art Lykke’s emphasis on a balanced structure of “ways-ends-means-
risk” developed at the US Army War College, matches quite nicely (Yarger 2008). The 
structure of the interaction (asking what strategies are available to each player) would fit 
with his “ways”, the population of the counterfactual results of each strategic interaction 
would require an appreciation of available “means” and “risk”, and the valuation of each 
outcome by the political leadership would constitute “ends”. Professional expertise and 
deep knowledge of military affairs would be required to construct the “ways-ends-means-
risk” framework, while the dominate-mix approach provides an additional toolkit to 
analyze it.   
 
Conclusions and ways forward 
The purpose of this essay has been to utilize a simple and intuitive framework to 
help systematize how researchers and practitioners engage in strategic decision. In doing 
so, the “dominate-mix” approach contributes to the study of strategy in two ways. The 
first contribution is to the field of strategic studies. By reconciling the “principles of 
war”, “context dependent” and “paradoxical logic” schools – three disparate and 
seemingly contradictory approaches to strategy – it helps to construct the logical 
foundations for unification within the field. It does so be recasting such concepts as 
strategic uncertainty and the principles of warfare into terms that fit with the broader 
social scientific endeavor. Finally, the dominate-mix approach may be of utility to 
practitioners – the simple logic of the approach can easily be applied to real-world 
situations. Tactical, operational, or strategic choices can be laid out, dominated may be 
removed from consideration, and – if no dominant strategy has been identified – the 
enemy should be made uncertain over the remainder. 
 Future work on this topic may proceed in two directions. Game theory offers a 
wealth of insight into strategic interaction that is currently being ignored by the strategic 
studies community. Such a body of knowledge can be further mined for useful ideas – 
even if the attendant math and abstraction are not imported along with them. In the 
opposite vein, the “dominate-mix” approach can be further concretized, both as a 
descriptive theory for the purpose of rigorous empirical testing (“have actors acted in an 
analogous manner in past military encounters?”) and as prescriptive theory for 
practitioners (“can we derive teaching tools for military planners to improve strategy 
choice in the future?”). In the end, both directions seek the same overall goal, furthering 
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Figure 1: Prisoners’ dilemma 
 Column Player 
Row Player 
 Left Right 
Top  2, 2 0, 3 
Bottom 3, 0 1, 1 
 
 
Figure 2: Matching pennies  
 Column Player 
Row Player 
 Head Tail 
Head  1, -1 -1, 1 
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